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Abstract 
 Genetically modified (GM) foods have caused many controversies.  One 
important controversy relates to tolerance—the impurity rate that is tolerated before a 
commodity must be labeled as genetically modified.  Currently, the United States does 
not have a specific tolerance or threshold level for GM foods.  This paper uses 
experimental auctions to determine consumers’ acceptance of non-GM foods with zero, 
1 percent, and 5 percent tolerance for genetically modified material.  Our results indicate 
that consumers would pay less for food that tolerates GM material, but the discount is not 
significantly different for foods with 1-percent and 5-percent GM content. 
 
 
Key words:  genetically modified (GM) foods, contamination thresholds, laboratory 
auctions, nth-price auction, vegetable oil, tortilla chips, russet potatoes 
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The use of biotechnology to create genetically-modified products has generated 
exuberance in those looking forward to a new Green Revolution.  GMOs, however, have 
attracted strong criticism from a set of antagonists, and some consumers are reluctant to 
accept new food products they perceive as risky, which includes products that involve 
some form of genetic modification.  Genetically modified (GM) foods remain 
controversial; some groups want GM foods banned (Greenpeace; Friends of the Earth), 
while others believe GM foods can help feed the world (Council for Biotechnology 
Education, Gates).  But because a complete GM ban has thus far been politically 
infeasible, environmental and consumer groups have successfully lobbied for labeling of 
GM foods in the European Union and some other countries, including Australia, Brazil, 
China, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand.   
A key issue in the labeling debate is tolerance, the acceptable percentage of GM 
impurity in a product before it must be labeled as GM or before it cannot use a non-GM 
label.  Countries have accepted positive tolerance standards because a zero tolerance 
standard is prohibitively costly, and a perfect segregation system can never be guaranteed 
(Shoemaker et al.; Golan, Krissoff, and Kuchler).1   
The European Union, for instance, revised its mandatory GM-labeling policy in 
January 2000 to contain a positive tolerance level—all foods have to be labeled as GM if 
any ingredient in the product is at least 1 percent GM (Rousu and Huffman, 2001).  The 
European Parliament recently voted for a 0.5 percent threshold (Food Traceability 
Report, 2002), but that will not take effect until 2003 at the earliest.  Australia’s GM-
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labeling policy is identical.  Many other countries have also have defined tolerance 
levels.  Japan tolerates up to 5 percent impurity before a GM label is needed.  Korea 
allows a 3 percent tolerance of GM material, and Brazil allows a 4 percent tolerance.  
Thailand has different tolerance levels for different products—5 percent for soybeans and 
3 percent for corn (Shipman, 2001).   
The United States currently does not require labeling of GM foods and does not 
have a positive tolerance standard.  The question we address here is how U.S. consumers 
react to a positive tolerance standard for GM ingredients.  Using the tools of statistical 
experimental design, we designed an experimental auction using three GM products to 
test two hypotheses:  (a) mean consumer bids for the GM-free products equal the mean 
bids for the GM-threshold products, set either at 1 percent or 5 percent and (b) mean bids 
for the 1-percent GM product equal the mean bids for the 5-percent GM product.2  Given 
our results, we reject the first hypothesis (a) but not the second one (b).  Our sample of 
consumers reduced their valuation of one unit of the commodity by an average of about 
10 percent relative to the certain baseline, irrespective of whether the GM threshold was 
set at 1 or 5 percent.  This finding points to a policy recommendation that is worthy of 
future study in nationwide survey work—if a tolerance level is to be used in the United 
States, a 5-percent GM threshold has the potential to be more efficient than a 1-percent 
GM threshold because the 5-percent level is less costly to meet and demand reduction is 
independent of the 1-and 5-percent tolerance levels.   
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Experimental Design  
Previous experimental auctions have examined the willingness to pay for GM 
foods.  Using potatoes, vegetable oil, and tortilla chips, U.S. consumers from the 
Midwest discounted GM-labeled foods by an average of 14 percent, and the discount 
could be higher (or lower), depending on the information the consumer received (Rousu 
et al).  Lusk et al., using 50 students from the Midwestern United States, found that most 
subjects in an experiment were no t willing to pay to upgrade a bag of non-GM chips to a 
bag of GM chips.  Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2002a) conducted experimental 
auctions using 97 consumers in France and found that consumers valued biscuits with a 
1 percent and a 0.1 percent tolerance level differently (they also were bidding on non-GM 
and GM biscuits—four biscuits total).  They reported that consumers did not view 
0.1 percent GM or 1.0 percent GM content as good as a GM-free product.  One problem 
with their experimental design is tha t they were selling consumers four different biscuits 
that were, in their words, close substitutes.  Selling four close substitutes leads to demand 
reduction by consumers perceiving the potential of obtaining multiple units (List and 
Lucking-Reilly), which could cause a confounding problem where one does not know if 
bid reduction is due to genetic modification or demand reduction.   
Our experimental auction markets used a randomized treatment, statistical 
experimental design.  Consumers bid on three food products that have different tolerance 
labels.  In one trial, all consumers bid on foods with a non-GM label, certified to be 
completely free of genetically engineered material in one trial, and in the other trial 
consumers bid on foods with a non-GM-label, indicating that a certain percentage of 
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genetically modified material, either 1 percent or 5 percent, was tolerated.  These specific 
tolerance levels are of particular importance because they match the current European 
and Japanese standards and would be the United States’ likely tolerance choices should a 
standard be enacted.   
The experimental design had two treatments.  The treatments were randomly 
assigned to three experimental units, each consisting of 13 to 16 adult consumers drawn 
from households in the Des Moines, Iowa, area and who were paid to participate.  Our 
total sample size is 44 consumers.   
Consider now the four elements in the experiments—the GM food, the auction 
mechanism, the experimental units, and the specific steps in the experiment.  First, we 
anticipated consumers might react differently to GM content for foods of different types.  
Believing that one food item was unlikely to reveal enough information, we selected 
three items:  a 32-ounce bottle of vegetable oil made from canola, a 16-ounce bag of 
tortilla chips made from yellow corn, and a 5-pound bag of russet potatoes.3  Second, 
following earlier work, we used the random nth-price auction for our GM-food 
experiments because it is designed to engage both the on- and off-the-margin bidders 
(also see Shogren et al).4   
Third, all auctions were conducted in Des Moines, Iowa.  Participants in the 
auctions were consumers contacted by the Iowa State University (ISU) Statistics 
Laboratory.  The Statistics Laboratory used a sample of randomly selected telephone 
numbers to solicit participants.  An employee of the ISU Statistics Laboratory called each 
number to make sure that it was in fact a residence and then asked to speak to a person in 
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the household who was 18 years of age or older.  They were told that “Iowa State 
University was looking for people who were willing to participate in a group session in 
Des Moines that related to how people select food and household products.”5   
Fourth, the experiment had nine specific steps.  In Step 1 each consumer signed a 
consent form and was given $40 for participating and an ID number to preserve the 
participant’s anonymity.  The participants then read brief instructions and completed a 
pre-valuation questionnaire.6  The questionnaire was purposefully given to consumers 
before the experiment to elicit demographic information and to capture the consumer’s 
prior perception of GM foods before bidding, which allowed us to compare their prior 
beliefs to the posterior beliefs after the valuation experiment.  In Step 2 participants were 
given detailed instructions (both oral and written) about how the random nth-price 
auction works.  A short quiz was given to ensure everyone understood how the auction 
worked.  In Step 3 the random nth-price auction was introduced by conducting an auction 
in which the consumers bid on one brand-name candy bar.  Each consumer examined the 
candy bar, submitted a bid, and the auction was run for real. 7  
In Step 4 the second practice round of bidding was run, and consumers bid 
separately on three different items:  the same brand-name candy bar, a deck of playing 
cards, and a box of pens.  Participants knew that only one of the two rounds would be 
chosen at random to be binding, which prevented anyone from taking home more than 
one unit of any product.  Following Melton et al., we used this random binding round to 
eliminate the threat of a person reducing his bids because he could buy more than one 
unit.  The consumers first examined the three products and then submitted their bids.  In 
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Step 5 the binding round and the binding nth-prices were revealed to the consumers.  All 
bid prices were written on the blackboard, and the nth-price was circled for each of the 
three products.  Participants could see the items they won and the market-clearing price.  
The participants were told that the exchange of money for goods was in another room 
nearby and would take place after the entire experiment was completed. 
In Step 5 the GM-food products were introduced for the next two rounds of 
bidding.  The two bidding rounds were differentiated by the food label—either a non-GM 
label certified to be GM-free or a non-GM label that indicated the tolerance of GM 
material.  Figure 1 shows the three types of labels used for the vegetable oil product; the 
other product labels were constructed similarly.  These labels were on the front of the 
package and large enough for participants to easily read them. 8  In one round (which 
could be round 1 or 2 depending on the experimental unit), participants bid on the three 
food products each with the certified non-GM food label.  In the other round, participants 
bid on the same three food products with the 1 percent or 5 percent GM tolerance level.  
Consumers knew that only one round would be chosen as the binding round that 
determined auction winners. 
In Step 6 consumers submitted sealed bids for the vegetable oil, tortilla chips, and 
potatoes, either with the certified non-GM label or the GM-tolerant label.  Each consumer 
bid on each good separately.  The monitor collected the bids and then told the participants 
that they would now look at another group of food items.  In Step 7 consumers examined 
the same three food products, each with a different label from round 1.  Again they 
examined the products and submitted their bids.9  In addition, each consumer bid on food 
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products with only two types of labels, the GM-free and the GM-tolerant label.  To 
correctly account for potential bias due to the order in which consumers saw the food 
products, we ensured that no consumer saw both GM-tolerant labels.  Seeing both GM-
tolerant labels would have required us to conduct additional treatments.  In Step 8 the 
monitor selected the binding round and the binding random nth-prices for the three goods 
and notified the winners.  In Step 9 each consumer completed a brief post-auction 
questionnaire, and the monitors dismissed the participants who did not win.  The 
monitors and the winners then exchanged money for goods, and the auction ended. 
Although we followed standard experimental auction valuation procedures (e.g., 
Shogren et al.), we made several refinements to our experimental design to better reflect 
consumer purchases.  First, our subjects submitted only one bid per product.  Hence, we 
stepped back from the protocol of using multiple repeated trials and posted market-
clearing prices to avoid any question of creating affiliated values that can affect the 
demand-revealing nature of a laboratory auction (see, for example, List and Shogren).  
Second, we did not endow our subjects with any food item and then ask them to 
“upgrade” to another food item; rather participants were paid $40, and then they bid on 
different foods in only two trials.  This avoids the risk that an in-kind endowment effect 
distorts the participant’s bidding behavior (e.g., Lusk and Shroeder) and of any credit 
constraint.  Third, each consumer bid on three unrelated food items, such that if he or she 
did not have positive demand for one or two products, we could still obtain information 
from them on their taste for genetic modification based on the second and (or) third 
products.  Fourth, we randomly assigned treatments to the experimental units; now 
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estimation of treatment effect is simply the difference in means across treatments (see 
Wooldridge).   
Finally, we used adult consumers over 18 years of age from two different 
Midwestern metropolitan areas that were chosen using a random digit dialing method.  
Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics.  The demographics of our sample 
do not perfectly match the U.S. census demographic characteristics for these regions, but 
they are similar and provide a sufficient representation for our initial probe into labeling 
and information for GM products (see Appendix A for the demographic characteristics of 
the areas).  In addition, because we use common food items available to shoppers in 
grocery stores and supermarkets, we wanted adults rather than students to better reflect a 
typical household of consumers.  Although several studies have used college 
undergraduates in laboratory auctions of food items (including Lusk et al. and Hayes et 
al.), they are not the best choice for participants when the items being auctioned are ones 
sold in grocery stores or supermarkets.  Using a national random sample of grocery store 
shoppers, Katsara et al. show that the share of college-age (18 to 24 years) shoppers falls 
far below their share in the population—8.5 percent of shoppers versus 12.8 percent in 
the U.S. Census of Population.  College students obtain a large share of their food from 
school cafeterias and a small share from grocery stores and supermarkets compared to 
older shoppers (Carlson, Kinsey, and Nadav).  Although our participants are slightly 
skewed toward women, Katsara et al. show that women make up a disproportional share 
of grocery shoppers—83 percent of shoppers versus 52 percent in the U.S. Census of 
Population.  A sample primarily of grocery store shoppers also weakens the sometimes-
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stated need for having students participate in several rounds of bidding to stabilize bids 
for food items.  We also minimize Hawthorne effects in bidding (Melton et al). 
Data and Results 
Two main results emerge from our experiment.  First, consumers reduced their 
demand for the products having GM-tolerance levels relative to the GM-free benchmark.  
Table 2 shows the mean and median bids by food type.  Twenty-eight participants bid in 
the 5 percent tolerance treatments; 16 participants bid in the 1 percent treatment.  Overall, 
the average consumer bid less on the food product with the GM-tolerance labels relative 
to the GM-free products.  Consumers  on average bid 7 cents less on the GM-tolerant oil, 
14 cents less on the tortilla chips, and 9 cents less on the potatoes.10  Consumers on 
average discounted the foods with the GM tolerance by an average of 7 to 13 percent.  
This is a significant demand reduction for 1 percent and 5 percent GM products relative 
to the GM-free benchmark.  In comparison, Rousu et al. observe that consumers 
discounted food that had a GM label without a tolerance level by an average of 14 
percent.  Pooling all observations,11 Table 3 shows we can reject the null hypothesis that 
bidding behavior over GM-tolerance labels is identical to that for the GM-free benchmark 
for the tortilla chips and the potatoes but not for the vegetable oil.12  Considering the 
1 percent and 5 percent GM treatments separately, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that bids differ for five of six products.13   This significant discount for the GM-tolerant 
food is consistent with Viscusi et al.’s findings.  In his study, consumers initially 
purchased a given product when told that it injured 15 out of 10,000 people who used the 
product, but over two-thirds of the consumers were unwilling to purchase the same 
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product when the chance of injury increased to 16 out of 10,000.  This indicates a strong 
reference risk effect, which could help explain why consumers placed such a large 
discount on the GM-tolerant food.   
Second, no statistically significant difference existed for consumers’ discount of 
the 5-percent GM products and 1- percent GM food.  Table 4 shows that at the 5 percent 
significance level we cannot reject the null hypothesis that demand reduction is 
independent of the two GM-tolerance level.  This supports the view that if a GM-
tolerance policy is implemented in the United States, consumers might not place a greater 
value on a 1 percent GM tolerance level relative to a 5 percent GM tolerance level.  
Because of the higher segregation and handling cost of a 1 percent tolerance level 
compared to a 5 percent level, society may be better off implementing a higher tolerance 
level.  Consumers value GM-free products, but if GM contamination does exist, we find 
no evidence that consumers prefer a 1 percent GM-tolerant food relative to a 5 percent 
GM-tolerant food. 
This result is consistent with the notion of surrogate bidding, or scope effects (for 
a review see Shogren).  Such bidding occurs when consumers reveal nearly the same 
willingness to pay to avoid varying levels of contamination relative to an uncontaminated 
product.  Surrogate bidding has been shown to exist in other experimental food markets.  
Hayes et al. used experimental auctions to show that when consumer bid to reduce risk by 
eliminating a cluster of foodborne pathogens they were indistinguishable from bids to 
reduce specific pathogens.  Using a survey, Hammitt and Graham found the same result:  
consumers were insensitive to different probability levels. 
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Conclusion and Implications  
 In our experimental treatments, consumers reduce their demand by an average of 
7 percent to 13 percent for each food product having 1-percent and 5-percent tolerance 
levels for GM material relative to GM-free food.  We found no evidence, however, that 
consumers value a food with a 1 percent GM tolerance greater than a food with a 
5 percent GM tolerance.  These results support the a policy proposal that, if the United 
States decides to allow a tolerance of GM material in food products, the 5 percent 
tolerance would be better socially than the 1 percent tolerance.  Consumers do not value a 
product with 1-percent impurity significantly higher than with 5-percent impurity, and it 
is less expensive for food producers and distributors to comply with a higher tolerance 
level.   
 Our findings suggest consumers are willing to pay a large premium to avoid 
contamination in an uncontaminated product but are not willing to pay to reduce 
contamination in a product that already has a small amount of contamination.  An 
interesting extension of this work, however, would be to examine whether consumers 
view 10-percent (20-percent) impurity significantly differently from 1- or 5-percent 
levels. Also, it would be interesting to see if our results generalize to other products by 
examining the marginal willingness to avoid small amounts of contamination.  If our 
result could be generalized to a broad range of products, which would need to be 
substantiated first, this could affect environmental policy.  For instance, it might help 
explain the fierce opposition to drilling in the Alaska wildlife area.  For example, it might 
suggest if proponents of drilling were initially successful in getting public approval for a 
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small amount of oil drilling, convincing the public to further increase drilling would be 
easier. 
Future research remains to be done.  More information is needed on the cost of 
producing non-GM crops at different tolerance levels.  Also, this study could be 
replicated internationally to provide evidence on the efficiency of GM-tolerance policies 
in foreign countries (e.g., Europe and Japan).  Trading across countries would be easier if 
all countries maintained the same tolerance levels.  If research could show that consumers 
have similar values for tolerance levels across countries, it could be useful for setting 
international GM-tolerance standards.  
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Figure 1.  The three types of labels used for the vegetable oil 
 
Vegetable Oil 
 
Net weight 32 fl.  oz. 
 
This product is made without 
genetic engineering * 
 
* This product is certified to BE FREE OF ANY 
GM-material. 
Vegetable Oil 
 
Net weight 32 fl.  oz. 
 
This product is made without 
genetic engineering * 
 
* Subject to a 1 percent tolerance, that is up to  
1 percent of any ingredient could be genetically 
engineered. 
Vegetable Oil 
 
Net weight 32 fl.  oz. 
 
This product is made without 
genetic engineering * 
 
* Subject to a 5 percent tolerance, that is up to  
5 percent of any ingredient could be genetically 
engineered. 
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Table 1.  Characteristics of the auction participants 
 
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev 
Gender 1 if female 0.70 0.46 
Age The participant’s age 49.7 17.1 
Married 1 if the individual is married 0.59 0.50 
Education Years of schooling 14.49  2.41 
Household Number of people in participant’s household 2.75 1.42 
Income The households income level (in thousands) 50.6 36.8 
White 1 if participant is white 0.95 0.21 
Read_L 1 if never reads labels before a new food 
purchase 
0.02  0.15 
 1 if rarely reads labels before a new food 
purchase 
0.02 0.15 
 1 if sometimes reads labels before a new food 
purchase 
0.34 0.48 
 1 if often reads labels before a new food purchase 0.41 0.50 
 1 if always reads labels before a new food 
purchase 
0.20 0.41 
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Table 2.  Mean bids 
 
A.  Mean bids—all participants   
  
 N Mean Bid Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
Food Type       
Oil 44 0.99 0.92 0.75 0 3.50 
Oil—Tolerance 44 0.92 0.76 0.75 0 2.50 
Chips 44 1.13 0.99 0.82 0 5.00 
Chips—Tolerance 44 0.99 0.80 0.75 0 3.49 
Potatoes 44 0.95 0.71 0.89 0 3.00 
Potatoes—Tolerance 44 0.86 0.67 0.84 0 3.00 
 
B. Mean bids when participants bid on food with a 5 percent tolerance level 
  
Food Type N Mean Bid Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
Oil 28 0.94 0.81 0.75 0 3.00 
Oil—Tolerance 28 0.88 0.71 0.68 0 2.50 
Chips 28 0.99 0.77 0.75 0 3.00 
Chips—Tolerance 28 0.90 0.69 0.73 0 2.00 
Potatoes 28 0.83 0.64 0.75 0 3.00 
Potatoes—Tolerance 28 0.76 0.65 0.75 0 3.00 
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C. Mean bids when participants bid on food with a 1 percent tolerance level 
  
Food Type N Mean Bid Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
Oil 16 1.06 1.12 0.75 0 3.50 
Oil—Tolerance 16 0.97 0.85 0.88 0 2.39 
Chips 16 1.38 1.28 1.13 0 5.00 
Chips—Tolerance 16 1.13 0.98 0.77 0 3.49 
Potatoes 16 1.15 0.81 1.00 0 3.00 
Potatoes—Tolerance 16 1.03 0.69 0.99 0 2.00 
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Table 3.  T-test—Non-GM foods with and without GM tolerance levels 
 
A. T-test on whether differences in bids for non-GM and GM-tolerant foods are 
different—all observations (N = 44) 
 Bid Non-GM Bid w/Tolerance Difference T-Test Statistic 
Oil 0.99 0.92 0.07 1.24 
Chips 1.13 0.99 0.14 2.44** 
Potatoes 0.95 0.86 0.09 1.70* 
 
B. T-test on whether differences in bids for non-GM and GM-tolerant foods are 
different—5 percent tolerance. 
 Bid Non-GM Bid w/Tolerance Difference T-Test Statistic 
Oil 0.94 0.88 0.06 1.05 
Chips 0.99 0.90 0.09 1.51 
Potatoes 0.83 0.76 0.07 1.33 
 
C. T-test on whether differences in bids for non-GM and GM-tolerant foods are 
different—1 percent tolerance 
 Bid Non-GM Bid w/Tolerance Difference T-Test Statistic 
Oil 1.06 0.97 0.09 0.71 
Chips 1.38 1.13 0.25 1.93* 
Potatoes 1.15 1.03 0.12 1.08 
* Significant at 10 percent level 
** Significant at 5 percent level 
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Table 4. T-test on whether consumers value foods with a 1 percent tolerance 
differently than foods with a 5 percent tolerance 
 
 Non-GM Premium—
5 percent  
Non-GM Premium—
1 percent 
Difference T-Test 
Statistic 
Oil 0.06 0.09 –0.03 –0.20 
Chips 0.09 0.25 –0.16 –1.33 
Potatoes 0.07 0.12 –0.05 –0.47 
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Appendix Demographic Characteristics of Polk County, IA (including Des Moines 
area) and Ramsey County, MN (including St. Paul area) 
 
Variable Definition Polk Ramsey Average 
Gender 1 if female 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Age Median age 45.7 45.7 45.7 
Married 1 if the individual is marrieda 59.5 51.4 55.5 
Education Years of schoolingb 13.52 13.76 13.64 
Income The median household’s income level 
(in thousands) 
46.1 45.7 45.9 
White 1 if participant is white 0.9 0.8 0.85 
All variables are for individuals of all ages, except for married, which is for individuals 18 or older; 
education, which is for individuals 25 or older; and age, which is for individuals 20 or older. 
aThe estimate of the number of married people who are 18 or older was obtained by taking the number of 
people married over 15 and assuming that the number of people who were married at ages 15, 16, and 17 
was zero.  This gives the percentage of married people who are 18 or older. 
bThe years of schooling was estimated by placing a value of 8 for those who have not completed 9th grade, 
10.5 for those who have not completed high school, 12 for those who have completed high school but have 
had no college, 13.5 for those with some college but no degree, 14 for those with an associate’s degree, 16 
for those with a bachelor’s degree, and 18 for those with a graduate or professional degree. 
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1 Although no literature exists on the costs of a low tolerance for GM foods, Klein and 
Brester estimate the cost for a zero-tolerance directive for beef packing companies.  They 
found that a zero-tolerance beef directive might cost society over $3 billion dollars 
annually.   
2 Some argue it is impossible to claim that a product is 100 percent GM-free, saying that 
more accurate testing equipment would detect GM material on almost any food that was 
made, even non-GM foods.  In our valuation experiments, we auctioned foods that were 
tested and found to not contain GM material; thus, we claimed in the auctions that the 
foods were certified to have no GM content. 
3 In the distilling and refining process for vegetable oils, essentially all of the proteins, 
which are the components of DNA and source of genetic modification, are removed, 
leaving pure lipids.  Minimal human health concerns should arise from consumption of 
the oil, but people might still fear that genetic modification could harm the natural 
environment.  Tortilla chips are highly processed foods that may be made from GM or 
non-GM corn, and consumers might have human health or environmental concerns or 
both.  Russet potatoes are purchased as a fresh product and are generally baked or fried 
before eating.  Consumers might reasonably see the potential concentration of genetic 
modification as being higher in potatoes than in processed corn chips.  Consumers might 
see both human health and environmental risks from eating russet potatoes. 
4 The random nth-price works as follows.  Each of k bidders submits a bid for one unit of 
a good; then each of the bids is rank-ordered from highest to lowest.  The auction monitor 
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then selects a random number—the n in the nth-price auction, which is drawn from a 
uniform distribution between 2 and k, and the auction monitor sells one unit of the good 
to each of the n–1 highest bidders at the nth-price.  For instance, if the monitor randomly 
selects n = 4, the three highest bidders each purchase one unit of the good priced at the 
fourth-highest bid.  Ex ante, bidders who have low or moderate valuations now have a 
nontrivial chance to buy the good because the price is determined randomly.  This 
auction attempts to increase the probability that insincere bidding will be costly.  Shogren 
et al. observe in an induced valuation experiment that, although the second-price auction 
engaged the on-margin bidders better, the random nth-price auction worked better at 
engaging off-margin bidders relative to the second-price auction.  Because we are 
interested in estimating the entire demand curve with greater precision not just the 
bidders near the market-clearing price, we selected the random nth-price auction with this 
noted caveat. 
5 The sessions were held on 1 day, and potential participants were informed that the 
sessions would last about 90 minutes.  Participants were also told that at the end of the 
session they would receive $40 in cash for their time.  The sessions were held at the Iowa 
State University Learning Connection, 7th and Locust Street, Des Moines.  Three 
different times were available—9 am, 11:30 am, and 2 pm—and willing participants were 
asked to choose a time that best fit their schedule.  The Statistics Laboratory followed up 
by sending willing participants a letter containing more information, including a map and 
instructions on when and where the meeting would be held, directions for getting there, 
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and a telephone number to contact fo r more information.  After accounting for unusable 
numbers, the response rate was approximately 19 percent.   
6 All experimental instructions are available from the authors on request. 
7 Throughout the auctions, when the participants were bidding on items in a round, they 
had no indication of what other items they may be bidding on in future rounds. They, 
however, were told that they would not be expected to pay for more than one unit of any 
commodity at the end of the session. 
8 See Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2002b) for evidence of how consumers frequently 
do not read food- labels that are on the back of packages. 
9 The order in which consumers see the different labeled products may cause different 
bids (see Huffman et al.).  For participants in the 5 percent tolerance treatments, one 
experimental unit bid on foods with the non-GM labels in the first trial and the 5 percent 
tolerance labels in the second trial, while another experimental unit viewed the food 
labels in the opposite order.  The participants who bid on the 1 percent tolerance labels all 
bid on the certified non-GM foods in the first trial and the non-GM foods with the 
1 percent tolerance in the second trial.  We intended to have a second group bid on foods 
with the 1 percent labels in the first trial and the certified non-GM labels in the second 
trial, but we were unable to because of a technical difficulty.  A Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
failed to reject the null hypothesis that the discount for the GM-tolerant food in the 
5 percent tolerance treatment was the same in both rounds at a 5 percent level of 
significance for any of the three products.  Therefore, the problem that prevented us from 
obtaining an additional experimental unit of people who bid on the non-GM foods with 1 
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percent tolerance did not appear to alter our results.  (All results not shown in the tables 
are available from the authors upon request.) 
10 Table 2 also shows that consumers bidding on 5 percent GM-tolerance discounted the 
oil by an average of 6 cents, the tortilla chips by 9 cents, and the potatoes by 7 cents.  
Consumers bidding on 1 percent-GM tolerance on average discounted the vegetable oil 
by 9 cents, the tortilla chips by 25 cents, and the potatoes by 12 cents.  A test of the null 
hypothesis that the bids for the non-GM foods are equal across treatments could not be 
rejected using a t-test. This is a good consistency check and does not reject the hypothesis 
that the bidding behavior was reasonable.  Between 32 percent and 41 percent of 
consumers bid less for the GM-tolerance food; but the percentage varied by food product.   
11 Because the participants in the three separate treatments were independent of each 
other, one can pool the data to test whether consumers discounted the GM-tolerant food.   
12 We also ran Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests and the results were similar:  the bids on the 
vegetable oil were not statistically different at any conventional significance level, the 
bids for the tortilla chips were significantly different at the 5 percent level, and the bids 
for the potatoes were significantly different at the 15 percent level. 
13 We also fitted several regressions to test the hypothesis that demographic 
characteristics, like consumer’s gender, household income, race, or age, could explain the 
difference in bids for the certified non-GM labeled food and the GM-tolerant food.  No 
demographic characteristic has a statistically significant impact on the difference in bids. 
